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ABSTRACT 
 
HEALTH CARE IN THE US DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS: 
CRITICAL ISSUES AND STRATEGIC PROGRESS 
 
by Kristin N. Sandoval 
 
The United States Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) is one of the largest 
executive departments in the nation, providing essential financial and medical assistance 
to veterans and their families.  As the VA continues to evolve and grow it is imperative to 
understand the department’s current capability constraints and how they arose in order to 
propose effective methods for addressing current issues and overcoming future policy 
pitfalls.  The most critical issues presently facing the VA concern appalling increases in 
wait-times and backlogs for services, which have emerged since 9/11 and are primarily 
the result of growing numbers of disabled veterans from the Global War on Terrorism 
(GWOT).  Much of the information and proposals regarding veteran benefits claims and 
conditions at VA hospitals focuses on current aspects of these issues.  This thesis 
examines the growth of the VA since its inception and evaluates the results of policies 
over the course of recent decades in order to analyze the causes of current issues and 
offer several policy recommendations for enhancing strategic progress in resolving those 
issues. 
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HEALTH CARE IN THE US DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS: 
CRITICAL ISSUES AND STRATEGIC PROGRESS 
 
 
Introduction 
Public support in the United States for disabled veterans began emerging in the 
early years of the American Revolutionary War, during which 25,000 soldiers were 
wounded, when the Continental Congress issued pensions as part of its efforts to 
encourage enlistments (Veterans Affairs 2015).  Although the federal government 
established the first residential medical care facility for veterans in 1811, there was no 
concerted national effort to address their needs until widespread casualties (more than 
476,000 wounded veterans) during the Civil War led to the establishment of state 
veterans homes throughout most of the country (Civil War Trust 2015).  The growing 
variety of pensions and benefits for veterans was expanded even further during the 
balance of the 19th century to cover their widows and dependents (Veterans Affairs 
2015). 
Historical Context 
The institutional origins of the Department of Veterans Affairs emerged shortly 
after the end of World War I when the special needs of 204,002 wounded soldiers from 
that conflict, such as the effects of mechanized warfare and mustard gas, prompted 
President Warren G. Harding to establish the Veterans Bureau in 1921 (Chambers 1999, 
849; Cooper et al. 2004).  However, due to corruption and ineffectiveness within the 
Bureau and other programs similar to it over the subsequent 10 years, President Herbert 
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Hoover consolidated the system into the Veterans Administration and elevated it to a 
federal agency in 1930 (Kizer et al. 2000, I-8; Veterans Affairs 2015).  As a result of 
even greater casualties during World War II, which added 670,846 disabled veterans to 
the VA’s responsibilities, President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Congress created the 
Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944 (Chambers 1999, 849; Cooper et al. 2004).  That 
act, which is commonly known today as the GI Bill of Rights, significantly increased the 
size of the nation’s middle class by offering low-interest home, education, and business 
loans; it also allowed veterans to attend college, receive unemployment benefits, and 
receive health care services (Kizer et al. 2000, I-8). 
The Veterans Administration also had to serve an additional 245,437 soldiers who 
were wounded during the Korean War and the Vietnam War between 1953 and 1979, all 
of whom received fewer VA benefits compared to WWII veterans (Chambers 1999, 849; 
Clemmitt et al. 2007, 707).  In 1970 the New Yorker and Life magazine published articles 
about poor VA hospital conditions and veteran health issues as a result of Agent Orange 
(Billitteri et al. 2010, 371-372; Whiteside 1970, 32).  In response, the Pentagon banned 
use of the defoliant.  Appalling VA hospital conditions remained unaddressed, however, 
so disabled veteran Ron Kovic launched a demonstration in 1973 to raise awareness by 
seizing Senator Alan Cranston’s office (Billitteri et al. 2010, 371-372; Clemmitt et al. 
2007, 707).  Progress on these types of matters occurred in 1979, when Congress 
approved 92 veteran clinics to provide counseling for a range of combat symptoms that 
psychiatrists termed Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and was subsequently 
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included in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (Billitteri et al. 
2010, 371-373). 
During the 1980s damage from radiation and chemical exposure started being 
investigated, which enabled veterans to win multiple legal initiatives.  Several of the key 
initiatives were 1) Agent Orange manufacturers agreed to a $180 million settlement, 2) 
the U.S. District Court ruled that the VA could not exclude 400,000 veterans from 
claiming benefits, and 3) President Ronald Regan approved VA benefits for 13 types of 
cancer for WWII veterans (Billitteri et al. 2010, 371-374; Cooper et al. 2004).  As more 
evidence accrued regarding the harmful effects of Agent Orange, the United States began 
fighting in the Persian Gulf War.  The growing number of benefits claims from the Gulf 
War, combined with those from WWII through the Vietnam War, began to severely 
strain the VA’s capabilities.  In 1992, despite the Pentagon’s insistence that no troops 
were exposed to toxic chemicals, approximately 100,000 Gulf War veterans began 
reporting physical and psychological symptoms that have been collectively termed the 
Gulf War Syndrome (GWS).  In 1997 medical researchers reported that GWS was the 
result of pesticides and nerve gas (Clemmitt et al. 2007, 707-710; Cooper et al. 2004).  
This led the Pentagon to admit that soldiers had been exposed to nerve gas and the VA 
began paying disability benefits. 
The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 spurred the United States into 
declaring a Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) that resulted in the deployment of more 
than a million troops to Iraq and Afghanistan since 2002 (Bilmes 2008, 84).  The 
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enemy’s use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) has resulted in a large number of 
disabilities that include the loss of limbs, traumatic brain injury, and PTSD.  This new 
generation of disabled veterans has pushed the VA system to the breaking point.  In 2003 
the VA suspended health care benefits to 200,000 veterans just prior to the launch of 
Operation Iraqi Freedom. Approximately 27,000 veterans filed for benefits in 2004, but 
nearly 9,000 were not processed within the calendar year due to a backlog of 334,000 
claims (Cooper et al. 2004).  In 2007 the Washington Post published a series on the 
deplorable conditions of outpatient veterans at the Walter Reed Army Medical Center 
outside Washington, D.C.  This led to the forced resignations of Francis Harvey, 
Secretary of the Army, and two medical officers, as well as recommendations by a 
presidential panel for a simpler disability rating system (Clemmitt et al. 2007, 707-710; 
Shanker & Stout 2007). 
Despite these changes, the disgraceful delays in timely access to veterans’ 
benefits continued.  In 2008 the wait-time in processing VA disability benefit appeals 
reached 563 days.  In 2010, the Institute of Medicine reported a shortage of mental health 
services for veterans and the VA technology chief called the claims management system 
“broken beyond repair” (Billitteri et al. 2010, 365-372).  The scandal came to a head 
when reports confirmed accusations of widespread misconduct and the long-term 
systematic cover-up of these appalling wait-times throughout the VA’s massive hospital 
system, which led to the resignation of VA Secretary Eric Shinseki in May 2014 (Shear 
& Oppel 2014).  As of July 2014, 523,849 veterans were waiting to receive disability 
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benefits; 260,837 of those individuals were waiting more than 125 days; and 244,939 
veterans had been waiting longer than a year for a response from the VA.  As of August 
2014, the average wait time for a claim response was 160 days and the average wait time 
to appeal a claim was 1,301 days (Anderson 2014). 
Critical Issues 
Although the VA was originally created to treat combat-related injuries and to 
help rehabilitate veterans with service-related disabilities, it has expanded in both size 
and responsibility.  It has “grown from the Veterans Administration with an operating 
budget of $786 million serving 4.6 million veterans in 1930 to the Department of 
Veterans Affairs with a budget of $63.5 billion serving nearly 25 million veterans” (VA 
History 2006).  The result is that the VA is now one of the oldest, largest, and most 
managerially complex health care systems in the world.  More specifically, it is our 
country’s leading centrally managed health care system and the principal unified provider 
of health care education for health care staff and physician residents (Kizer et al. 2000, I-
8-I-9; Department of VA Strategic Plan 2014).  The demand to meet the needs of service 
members and veterans continues to grow: the number of outpatient visits to VA health 
care facilities has grown by 26% over the last five years, and the VA system experienced 
an overall increase from 83.6 million to 94.6 million outpatient visits/fiscal year from 
2012 to 2014 (Shear & Oppel 2014; Trends in the Utilization 2013). 
Faced with continually expanding responsibilities and demands, the VA system 
must have the capacity to respond to growth and change in a timely way.  Unfortunately, 
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the cultural issues associated with promoting privatization, coupled with logistical issues 
involved with staffing and IT infrastructure, have only hindered its success in meeting 
these needs.  Furthermore, financial costs are a significant limiting factor given the need 
to restructure an antiquated system that already requires considerable funding to sustain 
its annual operations.  All of these issues have had a long-standing influence on policy 
and on the organization as a whole.  In an effort to minimize expenditures and increase 
productivity, which was spurred on by ideology and powerful lobbying efforts by the 
private sector, President Ronald Reagan initiated the movement towards privatization 
(McKelvey 2009, 20). 
Twelve years later, as the George W. Bush administration created the momentum 
required to convince the American public that minimizing the role of federal agencies 
was best for the nation, it was able to secure political support for privatizing government 
operations.  President Bush outsourced many services at the onset of the Iraq War and 
was able to influence the removal of individuals from key positions, including Congress-
man Chris Smith (R-NJ), Chair of the House Veterans Affairs Committee, based on his 
attempts to increase funding for the VA.  In his stead, party leaders chose Steve Buyer 
(R-IN) in the belief that he would counter the VA’s efforts to obtain more federal funding 
(McKelvey 2009, 21).  Their confidence was confirmed in 2005, when Buyer scolded the 
VA for misusing funds based on their budget predictions and argued that “we have to 
think to be more like a business” (Stoffer 2006, 21).  Their perception was that 
outsourcing would decrease government expenditures by promoting greater efficiencies 
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through corporate business practices.  However, large-scale privatization has often been 
more costly and less effective.  For example, IAP Worldwide Services was granted a 
five-year $120 million contract for support services at Walter Reed Army Medical Center 
in 2006.  Soon thereafter, in February 2007, the scandal regarding the abominable 
conditions at Walter Reed hit the headlines: 
Government reports reveal a pattern of mismanagement in procurement and 
oversight of private-sector contracts through Veterans Affairs.  “Their 
effectiveness is questionable,” Jon Wooditch, a deputy inspector general for the 
VA, told a House veterans’ affairs subcommittee on oversight and investigations 
in February 2008.  There are numerous examples of contracts gone wrong, 
including a $248 million contract for Dell computers that was “not necessary or 
in the best interest of the VA.” (McKelvey 2009, 21) 
When the VA began outsourcing health care services, it set up a fee claim process 
to reimburse non-VA health care providers through the VHA Fee Care Program.  Since 
its implementation, the fee process has experienced major problems with delayed and 
erroneous payments.  Between 2008 and 2010, expenditures increased by 1.4 billion 
dollars, a 46% rise in costs, while the new patient base during this time increased by only 
16%.  In 2009 and 2010, the VA Office of Inspector General found that VA Medical 
Centers made duplicate payments and paid out incorrect amounts totaling hundreds of 
millions of dollars.  The Chief Business Office estimated a 12% error rate per year, 
approximately $500 million in 2011 (Pane et al. 2011).  “Despite VA’s best efforts to 
automate the fee claims process through various pilot programs over the past 10 years, 
claims are still not automated and the current manual claims process places the VA at 
high risk for improper payments” (Jones 2012).  Substandard IT infrastructure requires 
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more employees and produces less efficient and effective results.  Adding insult to injury, 
the proposed solution to this problem offered by VA critics was to outsource claims 
processing; that is to say, their solution to the problems created by outsourcing services 
was to also outsource the billing for outsourcing services. 
In addition to these financial issues, there are also cultural aspects that indicate it 
is ineffective to operate the VA like a private sector company.  Senator Buyer was not the 
first person to promote the philosophy that government agencies would be more cost 
effective and efficient if they operated like private sector companies.  Many attempts 
have been made to reinvent the VA system over the years.  Examples of new programs to 
improve the quality of delivered health care starting in the mid-1990s include the Quality 
Enhancement Research Initiative (QUERI), the Veterans Integrated Service Network 
(VISN), and the Veterans Equitable Resource Allocation (VERA) (Kizer et al. 2000, I-
11-I-14).  Other authors found that reengineering efforts, which included a systematic 
approach to measuring and managing for quality, significantly increased the overall 
quality of care (Jha et al. 2003). 
The VA’s performance management program sought to fulfill its missions and 
visions by associating tracking measures with goals, including the development of quality 
indicators that reflected private sector performance measures.  This created a system 
whereby accountability was encouraged by the awarding of bonuses when management 
met specific goals (Kizer et al. 2000, I-14; Jha et al. 2003).  Not unexpectedly, this 
approach resulted in personnel concealing delays and falsifying reports to show delivery 
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of care within the 14-day goal in order to receive bonuses.  The Washington Post reported 
that VA claims processors and union representatives frequently ignored complicated 
claims in order to retain their positions, meet performance standards, or receive bonuses 
(Shinn et al. 2013).  Since 2000, more than 18 reports have disclosed efforts by VA 
personnel to conceal extensive wait-times (Jaffe & O’Keefe 2014). 
In January 2009, the US Senate approved Eric Shinseki to serve as Secretary of 
the Department of Veterans Affairs.  He attempted to change the leadership culture 
within the VA by holding quarterly meetings with all VA hospital directors to assess 
current issues, which had never happened under the direction of previous administrators 
(Jaffe & O’Keefe, 2014).  Despite Shinseki’s efforts to change VA hospital operations, 
though, reports began circulating in 2012 that revealed management misconduct.  In 
April 2014, the Chair of the House Committee on Veterans’ Affairs, Jeff Miller (D-FL), 
held a hearing to examine evidence that the Phoenix VA kept one set of records to 
demonstrate timely delivery of care and another set that illustrated significant deferrals 
(Gold 2014).  Later that month CNN aired “A Fatal Wait,” which revealed internal emails 
showing that top-level management condoned the act of shredding veteran appointment 
requests to distort wait-times (Gold 2014).  After the report attracted national attention, 
President Obama and Secretary Shinseki ordered a full investigation into the allegations. 
The VHA conducted a systematic audit of scheduling procedures and found that staff had 
been instructed to alter the requested appointment dates at least once in 64% of its 258 
facilities (Veterans Health Administration 2014). 
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Since then, more federal reports have surfaced, according to Shinn et al (2013), 
which detail the extent of the backlog cover-ups and the amount of money received by 
those responsible: 
According to salary data from the Office of Personnel Management, in 2011, a 
year in which the claims backlog ballooned by 155 percent, more than two-
thirds of claims processors shared $5.5 million in bonuses…  Those complex 
claims now make up much of the VA’s widely scrutinized disability claims 
backlog, defined by the agency as claims pending more than 125 days. 
 
In response to the revelation of this scandal, President Obama mandated that all backlog 
claims would need to be completed by 2015.  With over 1 million claims processed 
annually already, this mandate drives a process focused on quantity over quality that will 
most probably result in an abundance of errors (Shinn et al. 2013).  Many of those claims 
will likely need to be reprocessed, thereby costing the VA more man-hours and money.  
Thus a system that was intended to increase productivity and cost-saving measures via a 
private sector model has proven to be quite the opposite; not only were millions of dollars 
in bonuses received fraudulently, but the errors created in response to the result of this 
system will be less cost effective and less efficient over the long term. 
 Compounding these financial and cultural issues are several logistical issues that 
impede the internal effectiveness of the VA and significantly compromise the practicality 
of outsourcing services.  First, many experts state that the shortage of physicians, nurses, 
and other medical professionals directly influenced lengthy wait-times and the resulting 
scandal to cover it up.  Last July, for example, the VA told Congress that there were a 
total of nearly 46,000 vacancies throughout the country’s VA health care system, a 
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vacancy rate of 15.5% (Oppel 2014).  These vacancies are attributed to salary 
discrepancies, making VA positions less competitive in relation to equivalent positions in 
the private sector. 
Second, outdated electronic scheduling systems (some of which have been in use 
since the 1980s) hinder the ability of employees to track patients and prevent VA officials 
in Washington from obtaining accurate data (Jaffe & O’Keefe 2014).  The Veteran 
Affairs system is a vast network of facilities spread across the nation that encompasses 
820 community-based outpatient clinics, 151 hospitals, and 56 regional offices.  As of 
2013, there are 300 Veterans Centers in the United States (Trends in the Utilization, 
2013).  These centers help guide veterans through the lengthy and convoluted disability 
claims process in order to receive benefits. 
If a veteran sustains multiple disabilities, each disability must be processed 
through a separate claim.  The Developmental Phase consists of gathering all 
documentation necessary for the regional office to determine the patient’s disability 
rating, which may include documents from non-VA health care providers.  During the 
developmental phase, the Veteran Center submits the disability documentation to the 
regional office, which processes the application.  The regional office, in turn, sends the 
hospital information that determines which kind of doctor or specialist the veteran needs 
to see.  It may take 6 months before an appointment is scheduled.  The physician, upon 
examination, may then decide to treat the patient directly or may recommend other 
specialists.  The physicians then submit paperwork back to the regional office, which 
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uses that information to determine the patient’s level of disability.  The regional office 
then schedules an appointment for the patient to review the medical file and submits that 
information to the rating board.  On average it takes 10 weeks for the board to make a 
decision. 
 In the Notification Phase, the regional office sends the patient a letter explaining 
what medical information and regulations were used to determine the patient’s disability 
rating and encloses a fact sheet about the patient’s right to appeal.  If the veteran chooses 
to pursue the appeals process, he or she has two options depending on whether or not 
there is new evidence to submit for reconsideration.  The patient must write a letter 
explaining why he or she disagrees with the disability decision and completes a form.  
Then an experienced VA official reviews the case and mails a notification letter to the 
patient.  If the veteran still disagrees with the decision, a teleconference or a travel board 
hearing is scheduled.  Technically, an appellate case can continue to be reviewed until the 
Supreme Court makes a decision. 
When a veteran submits a request to a regional office for an appointment there is 
no tracking process to determine whether the office received the letter.  Since there is no 
internal data system, the Veteran Center cannot give the veteran a status update regarding 
a claim.  Once an appointment is made the regional office sends a notification via mail. 
This process is the same for active duty members; however, if the soldier is stationed at a 
base and his or her family is located at a different address, often times the letter is sent to 
the family’s address.  If the soldier misses the appointment, because he or she is never 
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informed directly, the VA either places him or her on the waitlist again.  Alternatively, in 
case a disability or appeals claim decision is pending, the VA either denies the appeal or 
finalizes a disability claim. 
Third, in addition to lacking the technology infrastructure that enables internal 
communication between departments, there currently is no method to track and monitor 
the care that veterans receive in the community.  Moreover, there is no single department 
that incorporates civilian health records into the VA health care system.  Clinical infor-
mation often does not return to the VA in a timely manner or does not return at all.  The 
lack of coordinated care and digitized data also leads to problems of inconsistency (Jones 
2012).  It is much more difficult and time-consuming to access, compile, and analyze 
hundreds of thousands of claims that are handwritten on paper forms and mailed than 
information that is entered into a digital system.  Without a comprehensive digital 
system, it becomes nearly impossible to determine if patients with similar symptoms are 
being treated in a similar way and receiving similar disability rates.  “In addition, the lack 
of care coordination hinders VA’s ability to optimize its resources because there can be 
duplicative and conflicting treatment regimen.  This not only results in wasted resources, 
but also can cause adverse medical outcomes” (Jones 2012). 
In 2010, under the direction of Secretary Erik Shinseki, VA Chief Technology 
Officer Peter L. Levin began implementing pilot programs for a technology overhaul 
with a deadline of 2015 (Billitteri et al. 2010, 372).  As of August 2014, though, the VA 
is still heavily reliant upon paper documents and postal mail instead of using an internal 
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database or an internet-based system to complete and transmit information from one 
department to another.  For over 14 years the VA has intended to create and implement a 
new scheduling system, but a chronic lack of funding and ever more pressing matters 
continue to delay progress.  Levin summarized the root of the problem when he observed 
that “It’s a simple question of bandwidth and priorities” (Jaffe & O’Keefe 2014).  In sum, 
the VA’s use of antiquated communication methods is clearly responsible for missed 
appointments, errors in tracking appointments, delays in processing claims, and 
redundant or inconsistent treatment. 
Levin’s initiative has demonstrated that attempting to overhaul one component of 
the VA is very time consuming and difficult, even without regard to securing the finances 
required to fund such a project.  A comprehensive overhaul would require considerable 
financial support from the US government, which might be difficult to approve given 
current budget issues and the amount of money already being spent on treating veterans.  
The department’s $154 billion annual budget has more than doubled since 2006; this 
includes approximately $12 billion dollars spent each year on disability benefits for the 
veterans of the Vietnam War that ended almost 40 years ago and more than $4 billion 
each year for veterans of the Gulf War (Bilmes 2008; Shear & Oppel 2014).  Bilmes 
(2008) states that since the beginning of the invasion of Iraq “more than a third of 
750,000 troops discharged from the military so far have required treatment at medical 
facilities, including at least 100,000 with mental health conditions and 52,000 with post 
traumatic stress disorder.” 
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There are 15 wounded soldiers for every fatality in modern conflicts, largely 
because medical technology has made it possible for significantly more soldiers to 
survive battle-inflicted injuries than in previous wars (Bilmes 2008).  As the WWII and 
Korean War veteran population decreases over the next 20 years, the overall number of 
veterans is projected to decrease from approximately 21 million to approximately 14 
million by 2040 (Veteran Population Projections 2013).  During this same time period, 
however, medical care expenditures are expected to continue rising significantly – as they 
did between 2000 and 2009, when the veteran population decreased by over three million 
people but medical care expenses almost doubled (Trends in Geographic 2010).  Bilmes 
states that “even using conservative estimates, the long-term cost of providing medical 
care alone to Iraq and Afghanistan war veterans over their lifetimes could approach…  
$390 billion” (2008, 85). 
Strategic Progress 
Deciding how to resolve the issues surrounding the backlog of claims will 
ultimately be hashed out in Congress.  This will probably be very difficult at the present 
time, given the extreme partisanship characterizing national policy-making, for both 
political parties can’t even agree on what the problems are – much less on what the 
solutions might be.  As Shear & Oppel (2014) note, “Republicans say the problem is not 
a lack of money, but rather inefficiencies in the delivery of care.  Democrats say that the 
problem is a serious shortage of doctors and not enough hospitals.”  Regardless of which 
issue is addressed first, any attempts to make effective changes will be futile without 
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clear directives on how to achieve each goal.  John A. Boehner (R-OH), Speaker of the 
United States House of Representatives, said after President Obama’s acceptance of 
Secretary Shinseki’s resignation that “until the president outlines a vision and an effective 
plan for addressing the broad dysfunction at the V.A., today’s announcement really 
changes nothing” (Shear & Oppel 2014). 
The new Secretary of Veterans Affairs, Robert McDonald, recently released the 
Department of Veterans Affairs Strategic Plan Framework (2014), which is a one-page 
summary of goals and objectives for the agency.  The Department of Veterans Affairs 
FY2014-2020 Strategic Plan (2014) is a 45-page document that discusses those goals and 
objectives in more detail, but it fails to address how anything will be accomplished.  In a 
press release on September 8, McDonald announced a 90-day plan that includes holding 
meetings 2-3 times per month, hiring tens of thousands of new medical staff, retaining 
them through competitive pay plans that are comparable to the private sector, stream-
lining access to VA websites, and flattening the power hierarchy within the department 
(Wax-Thilbodeaux 2014; Oppel, 2014).  While hiring more staff is a direct approach to 
handling issues that affect wait-times, it is not clear why the other two projects were 
placed as top priorities and the Secretary did not go into detail about how they will be 
accomplished or what goals they will address. 
Considering that the Veterans Health Administration conducted a thorough 
investigation in May of 2014, a few months prior to McDonald’s appointment as 
secretary, it would have been more logical to set priorities based on system weaknesses 
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detailed in the investigation’s findings (Veterans Health Administration 2014).  The audit 
identifies issues that fall into both short-term and long-term solution categories.  For 
example, it suggests that the appointment process based on a veteran’s desired date be 
revaluated and revised to reflect more standardized scheduling practices.  Altering the 
approach to scheduling appointments by basing it on a verbal negotiation between the 
patient and the clinic to set a specific date and time would eliminate the need for staff to 
change request dates or use alternate forms of record keeping for appointment requests 
(Veterans Health Administration 2014, 2).  It would eliminate the need for the 14-day 
policy because the process would no longer be based upon appointment requests.  It 
would also not require changes in the IT infrastructure or the use of different interfaces, 
meaning that this change could be implemented immediately.  Moreover, VA personnel 
would receive immediate modified scheduling training, which the audit report suggested 
would need to occur nonetheless (Veterans Health Administration 2014, 2-5).   
The report also lists the need for the creation and implementation of a long-term 
software update to integrate systems and departments (Veterans Health Administration 
2014, 4).  This is a much more extensive and involved process than what the Secretary 
proposed.  Adjusting the interface of exist-ing websites to allow individual access to all 
sites using one username and password does not change the disjointed nature of the 
separate websites or increase staff’s ability to manage records.  The VA needs to develop 
a detailed plan that addresses how to update the IT infrastructure, for the problems related 
to claims processing and integrating non-VA health records will not be resolved until 
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there are updated software programs in place – ones that can integrate digital information 
from various sources and allow access to records by different departments.  The 
challenge is that the IT infrastructure has not been updated to support the bandwidth 
required to use new software simultaneously across all facilities.  Resolving the lack of 
appropriately capable software and IT infrastructure should be at the top of the priority 
list because they directly affect problems with claims processing, records integration, and 
interdepartmental communication. 
Lack of funding isn’t the limiting factor here, for the agency has the financial 
resources to make these improvements.  If no software currently exists that can meet VA 
needs, then the department should use its resources to create the necessary software.  
Likewise, it should use those resources to install the necessary IT infrastructure to 
support modern software.  The Secretary should propose a comprehensive plan that 
details the steps necessary to execute a system-wide technology overhaul.  Then, within 
that overarching plan, he should set a series of goals with deadlines that can actually be 
achieved and specify the steps required to complete those goals. 
For example, one goal might be to increase Internet speed and capability for all 
facilities.  The steps necessary to execute the goal would be divided into an Assessment 
Phase, a Completion Phase, a Maintenance Phase, and a Monitoring Phase.  The Assess-
ment Phase would consist of [1] determining the cost of installing a high speed | high 
capacity internet system for all 1327 VA health facilities within a one year period of time 
by requesting a contracting bid from a variety of civilian companies; [2] comparing those 
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bids to the cost assessment of using military/government services, if using the military as 
a service provider is a possible option; [3] comparing the system’s cost of maintenance 
with those of different civilian services and the military/government service options; [4] 
determining if the service to install the new system will be outsourced or completed 
through military/government services; [5] creating a process to oversee the completion of 
the project; and [6] constructing a plan if the system becomes faulty or ever fails. 
The Completion Phase would entail [1] securing the funding; [2] methodically 
installing the service in facilities with the highest demand first; [3] overseeing the process 
and reporting to top VA officials on the progress towards completion; and [4] completing 
the project by the contract’s deadline.  The Maintenance Phase would consist of [1] 
verifying that the system is working as intended in all facilities; [2] routinely confirming 
that the system continues to operate as intended; [3] implementing all updates as required 
to optimize the system’s functionality; and [4] assessing whether additional modifications 
need to be made. 
All of the steps within all of the phases would require details about the specific 
actions (or sub-steps) required to implement those steps.  Parsing one large goal into 
many specific goals with phases and steps to achieve each of those goals would enable 
directives to be well defined and the process to be transparent.  This is one example of a 
much larger initiative to overhaul the system that is, in turn, part of solving a problem 
that requires a systems approach.  By effectively implementing high-speed and high 
capacity internet, the VA can set the foundation for complex computer software to run 
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optimally across all facilities, which will allow for interdepartmental communication and 
integration of digital claims and health records across multiple interfaces. 
CONCLUSION 
In closing, it is clear that the Department of Veterans Affairs has been unable to 
adapt to changing conditions that were triggered by 9/11 and have been amplified by the 
country’s pursuit of a Global War on Terrorism.  The increased number of American 
soldiers actively engaged in asymmetrical conflicts, combined with the advent of new 
medical technology, has enabled more soldiers to survive traumatic injuries that would 
have been fatal in previous wars.  These soldiers are now depending on the VA to 
provide new and more varied forms of health care and rehabilitative services to meet their 
medical and financial needs.  As the VA has evolved and expanded to assimilate these 
soldiers into the system, policies have been developed and implemented to improve the 
department’s efficacy.  However, many of those policies have proven to further hinder 
the VA’s ability to handle increasing numbers of claims and health care costs.  The result 
has been dramatic increases in wait-times and backlogs that make it difficult, and in 
many cases, impossible for disabled veterans to receive timely and appropriate care. 
Efforts initiated by the second Bush administration to promote privatization and 
outsourcing as the solution to VA problems have led to a perfect storm of unintentionally 
adverse consequences, characterized by significant decreases in overall quality of care 
and significant increases in financial costs.  Unfortunately, internal cultural factors have 
fostered fraudulent activity, abuses by civilian contractors, and a systemic failure to 
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properly process medical claims.  Shortages in staffing and an outdated IT infrastructure, 
along with wasteful expenditures and increasing health care costs, have pushed Veterans 
Affairs to the breaking point.  In order for the VA to thrive in the future, it is imperative 
that policies focus on addressing the critical issues identified in this thesis.  These are 
fundamental weaknesses that permeate the entire VA system and cannot be resolved 
without an effective plan with clear directives that focus on achieving both short-term 
and long-term goals to directly enhance system-wide capabilities. 
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